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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal involves various decisions made by the District Court during a bench trial 
held on June 11 and 12, 2012. The Plaintiffs filed this action on March 1, 2011 seeking damages 
for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
defamation/libel, and libel per se. l The District Court, following trial, filed its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Order Following Bench Trial dated September 20,2012 
(hereinafter, "Findings and Conclusions")? At or prior to trial, Plaintiffs' claims of unjust 
enrichment, defamation/libel, and libel per se were dismissed.3 The Findings and Conclusions 
denied Plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and two claims not 
contained in Plaintiffs' pleadings; injunction and piercing the corporate veil. However, the 
District Court found Defendant April Fano (hereinafter, "April") breached a contract with the 
Defendants. The Court assessed $6,250.00 in contract damages, and $50,000.00 in punitive 
damages against April. 4 
Defendant Right Way Publishing, LLC was not found liable for any issue raised by the 
Defendants at trial. 5 
1 R., p. 1, Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint. 
2 R., p. 41., Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Following Bench Trial. 
3 Id. 
4 R., p. 54. 
:; R.,p. 54. 
The District Court entered a Judgment dated September 20,2012 in favor of the 
Respondents and against Appellant April Fano in the amount of$56,250.00.6 No judgment was 
entered against Right Way Publishing, LLC. 7 
Plaintiffs and Right Way Publishing, LLC tiled motions for an award of their attorney's 
fees and costs.s The District Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees, but denied 
Right Way Publishing's' motion for attorney's fees. 9 The District Court entered a Final 
Judgment on February 12,2013 awarding Plaintiffs attorney's fees in the amount of $27,670.00 
and costs in the amount of$516.70 in addition to the $56,250.00, for a total judgment of 
$84,436.70. 10 
B. Statement of the Facts 
All facts set forth herein are either facts agreed to by all parties, admissions by Vianna 
Stibal, or undisputed facts provided by the Defendants at trial. April and the Defendants were 
involved in previous litigation in Bonneville County Case No. CV -2009-1852, (hereinafter, 
"Previous Litigation). I I PlaintiffVianna Stibal and her business entities brought the Previous 
Litigation alleging that April had defamed Vianna Stibal. April, the Defendant, brought three 
(, R., p. 56., Judgment. 
7 Id. 
SR., p. 62., Opinion and Order on Motions for Attorney Fees. 
9 R.,p.64. 
10 R.Supp., p. 48., Final Judgment 
II Tr., p. 89, 1. 19 - p. 90, 1. 2. 
2 
counterclaims; fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. 12 April 
was allowed to seek punitive damages in the Previous Litigation. I} Trial was scheduled for 
August 3, 2010. 14 April believed that she had a very good case against Vianna, and was actively 
preparing for trial in the weeks leading up to the trial date. April had no intention of settling 
before trial. 15 
During the course of the Previous Litigation, April and Vianna attended mediation on 
July 29, 2010, six days before trial was scheduled to begin.I6 April did not believe the case 
would settle at mediation, and testified at trial that the case would not have settled if mediation 
had not occurred. 17 
The Parties settled at mediation, and entered into a Mutual Release, Hold Harmless, 
Confidentiality, and Settlement Agreement, signed on July 30,2010 ("Release Agreement"). 18 
Pursuant to the terms of the Release Agreement, Vianna paid April $12,500.00. The Parties 
agreed upon several provisions, including the following paragraphs: 
12 Tr., p. 89, 1. 19 - p. 90, I. 2. 
13 Tr. p. 272, 1. 14 - p. 273, 1. 3. 
14 R., p. 73, Clerk's Certification of Exhibits, Defendant's Exhibit A. The Court took 
judicial notice of the trial date. Tr. p. 90, 11. 12-18. 
IS Tr., p. 273, II. 4-17. 
16 Tr., p. 273, 1.13 p. 273, 1. 22. 
17 Tr., p. 273, 1. 18 - p. 274, 1. 14. 
18 R., p. 73, Clerk's Certification of Exhibits, Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Release Agreement 
dated July 30,2010. 
3 
4. The Parties agree to release each other, and hold each other harmless for any act of 
the Parties which offered [sic] before the date of this Agreement, whether known or 
unknown. 
5. Vianna and April, for themselves, and for each, their respective heirs, executors, 
administrators, lienholders, predecessors, successors and assigns does hereby fully 
and forever remise, release and discharge one another, their related corporations, 
successor corporations, affiliated companies, investors, insurers, partnerships, 
partners, trusts, trustees, beneficiaries, heirs, personal representatives, predecessors, 
successors, assigns, directors, officers, employees, agents and attorneys, release and 
hold each other harmless from any and all claims, liabilities, actions, causes of action 
known and unknown, demands, rights, damages, costs, attorneys' fees, loss of 
profit, expenses and compensation whether related or unrelated [sic] 19 to the Lawsuit, 
this Settlement, or any other connection between the Parties except as specifically set 
forth herein. 
8. April and Vianna agree to keep confidential the terms of this Agreement, as well as 
all matters, documents and medical records pertaining to the Lawsuit unless: 
a. Ordered to do so by a court of law, 
b. Upon the request of a law enforcement office acting in his or her official 
capacity, 
c. Confidential disclosure to an accountant or tax adviser in connection with 
preparation of income tax returns or other financial documents is 
necessary; 
d. Agreed to by the parties. 
9. April and Vianna agree not to make any disparaging, defaming, or otherwise negative 
comment regarding each other to any third party as of the date of this Agreement 
forward unless: 
a. Ordered to do so by a court of law, 
b. Upon the request of a law enforcement office acting in his or her official 
capacity, 
c. Agreed to by the parties. 
11. The confidentiality and nondisclosure requirements of this mutual release and hold 
harmless agreement shall not apply to any statements, disclosures, or other 
19 In trial, the Court acknowledge an error in the agreement, that it should have read 
"related or unrelated as opposed to "related or not unrelated." The Court acknowledged the word 
"not" was placed in the wrong place, but based upon content, the parties intended the agreement 
to read, "Whether or not related or unrelated." Tr., p. 93, 1. 22 - p. 94, 1. 9. 
4 
communications to third parties made before the date of this Agreement, whether 
known or unknown. 
12. The mutual release and hold harmless agreement shall apply to any statements, 
disclosures, or other communications to third parties made before the date of this 
)0 
Agreement, whether known or unknown.-
The Parties released each other from liability for any conduct that would otherwise be 
actionable, whether known or unknown, that was committed before July 30, 2010. Vianna 
brought the litigation for defamation, and was therefore aware that April Fano had made negative 
comments about her. The Parties reaffirmed this "known or unknown" language four times, in 
paragraphs 4, 5, 11, and 12. Thus, pursuant to the terms of the Release Agreement, if either party 
were to discover any disparaging, defaming, or otherwise negative comments made by the other 
party before July 30,2010, said party had relinquished any right to sue upon execution of the 
Release Agreement. 
Before the mediation, April was under no contractual obligation restricting her ability to 
make comments about Vianna. 21 In about February or March, 2010, April provided portions of 
Vimma's deposition taken during the Previous Litigation, and emails between April and Vianna 
prior to the Release Agreement, to Lindsey Stock. 22 Lindsey Stock is Vianna Stibal's former 
daughter-in-Iaw. 23 Lindsey Stock wrote a book describing her relationship with her former 
20 Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Release Agreement dated July 30, 2010 (emphasis added). 
21 Tr., p. 274, 11. 15-25. 
22 Tr., p. 233, l. 20 - p. 233, l. 23. 
23 Jd 
5 
spouse and Vianna Stibal called Shady Healing. 24 Lindsey's purpose in writing the book was to 
expose falsehoods by Vianna Stibal regarding claims she makes to have healing powers. Vianna 
Stibal is the founder of a business called Nature Path, Inc., wherein she promotes a healing 
technique called Theta Healing. Vianna claims that by utilizing ThetaHealing she cured herself 
of cancer, and could teach other people to do similar healings. Lindsey Stock wrote Shady 
Healing to express her opinions after a year and a half of research that Vianna Stibal had never 
been diagnosed with cancer, had not healed herself of cancer, and therefore Theta Healing is 
fraudulent. 25 
Although April gave Lindsey Stock portions of Vi anna's deposition from the Previous 
Litigation, April did not furnish any medical information about Vianna to Lindsey Stock because 
of a protective order entered by the court in the Previous Litigation. 26 There is a medical record 
in the book Shady Healing. Vianna testified that those medical records were provided to April 
and her attorney during the previous iitigation,n and that her deposition, including her medical 
records could not have been provided to Lindsey Stock by anyone other than April or her 
attorney.28 However, the medical record Vianna was referring to, the same record in the book, 
24 Tr., p. 235, 1. 4 - p., 235, 1. 15. 
25 Tr., p. 235, 1. 16 - p. 237, 1. 9. 
26 Tr., p. 275, 11. 18-22, see also, Tr. p. 240, 1. 15 p. 241, 1. 1. 
n Tr., p. 36,11. 17-20. 
'8 ~ Tr., p. 100,1. 21 - p. 101, I. 5. 
6 
was posted on Vianna's Facebook page and other internet sites.29 Lindsey Stock got the medical 
records from the internet, not from Apri1.3o 
Lindsey Stock used the information she obtained from April, the internet, and other 
people who knew Vianna, as well as personal experiences to write the book Shady Healing. 3 ] 
April did not write any portion of the book, and Lindsey takes full responsibility for the book.32 
All information April supplied to Lindsey was given prior to July 30, 2010, and no medical 
records were provided.33 April never told Lindsey the terms of her settlement with Vianna.34 
After Lindsey Stock was unable to find an acceptable deal with a publisher, she began 
work to publish the book herself in May, 2010. In May, 2010, Lindsey began talking with 
Sunrise Press about printing the book after it was finished. 35 Lindsey Stock and April registered 
the company Right Way Publishing, LLC on July 22, 2010.36 Prior to being registered, Right 
Way Publishing, LLC had the book Shady Healing printed. The printing was finished on July 
21,2010.37 
29 R., p. 73, Clerk's Certification of Exhibits, Defendants Exhibit I, and Tr. p. 238,1. 2 -
p. 239, 1. 13, p. 275, 1. 18 - p. 276, 1. 2. 
30 Id. 
3] Tr., p. 235, 11. 11-15. 
32 Tr., p. 237, II. 10-11, see also p. 241, 11. 2-7, see also p. 198,11. 4-19. 
33 Tr., p. 239,1. 14-p.241,1. l,see also p. 185,ll.13-20. 
34 Tr., p. 248, 11. 1-4. 
35 Tr., p. 243, 1. 14 - p. 244, I. 3. 
36 Tr., p. 242, 1. 5 - p. 244, 1. 6, see also p. 276,11. 12-21. 
31 Tr., p. 244, 11. 14-17, see also, p. 277, 11. 3-17. 
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Since signing the Release Agreement, April has not been paid any money by Right Way 
Publishing.38 Since execution of the Release Agreement, Lindsey Stock has had physical 
possession of the copies of the book 'Shady Healing" for distribution.39 Lindsey was responsible 
for processing orders for the book, and did all promotions for the book.4o April never processed 
any orders for the book, promoted the book, or made any public appearances to promote the 
book.41 April's only role with Right Way Publishing after entering into the Release Agreement 
has been to receive the bank statements that are mailed to her home.42 April, by viliue of only 
owning only 50% of Right Way, did not have the authority to stop the distribution of 'Shady 
Healing,' which was done in the ordinary course ofbusiness.43 Lindsey Stock was unwilling to 
give up any of her ownership in Right Way Publishing, LLC to allow April Fano to stop the 
distribution oftbe book Shady Healing.44 
No evidence was presented at trial of any disparaging, defaming or otherwise negative 
comments made by April about Vianna since entry of the Release Agreement.45 The Plaintiffs 
relied solely on statements in the book Shady Healing, which was published prior to the Parties 
38 Tr., p. 279, 11.6-7. 
"9 -, Tr., p. 244, 1. 18 - p. 245, I. 2. 
40 Tr., p. 245, II. IO-2l. 
41 Tr., p. 246, 1. 14 - p. 247, I. 3. 
42 Tr., p. 247, 11. 9-16, see also, p. 278, II. 19-24. 
43 Tr., p. 207, 11. 6-21, see also, p. 257, I. 9 - p. 258, 1. 3. 
44 Tr., p. 257, 1. 9 - p. 258, 1. 3. 
45 Tr., p. 181, 11. 9-12., p. 248, 11. 5-8. Plaintiffs did not provide any evidence of any 
statements other than Lindsey Stock's statements in the book 'Shady Healing' they purpOlied to 
be a violation of the terms of the Release Agreement. 
8 
entering into the Release Agreement.46 Vianna Stibal knew, prior to entering the Release 
Agreement, that April had made negative comments about her because she had sued April for 
defamation in the Previous Litigation. 
IV. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Did the District Court err when it determined that Defendant April Fano breached 
the contract between the parties when all evidence of breach predated the contract? 
B. Did the District Court err in finding $6,250.00 in contract damages against 
Defendant April Fano when no evidence of consequential damages was offered? 
C. Did the District Court err in its assessment of punitive damages against Defendant 
April Fano when all of April Fano' s conduct predated the contract? 
D. Were the punitive damages assessed against Defendant April Fano unjust or 
excessive when the Court did not have any financial information for April Fano? 
E. Did the District Court err in awarding attorney fees and costs to the Plaintiffs 
when the amount the District Court awarded them in contract damages was less than 10% 0 the 
amount they sought at trial? 
F. Did the District Court err when it failed to award attorney's fees and costs to 
Right Way Publishing, LLC when it prevailed on all claims against it? 
G. Should the Appellants be granted their reasonable attorney's fees and costs on 
appeal? 
46 Tr., p. 102,1. 26 - p. 103,1. 8. 
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v. ARGUMENT 
The District Court's finding that April breached the contract and its subsequent award of 
punitive damages was not proper. No evidence was presented at trial of a breach by April Fano 
after the effective date of the Release Agreement. The Parties specifically released each other 
from any such conduct occurring before the execution of the Release Agreement, whether 
known or unknown. Because no such evidence was offered, it was clearly erroneous for the 
District Court to assess damages, including punitive damages against April. Regardless, April's 
conduct was not fraudulent or oppressive. While the court erred in assessing any damages 
against April, the District Court awarded the Plaintiffs less than 10% of the contract damages 
they sought at trial. The only party that truly prevailed at trial was Right Way Publishing, LLC, 
who was not found liable on any count. Thus, Right Way Publishing, LLC should have been 
awarded its attorney's fees rather than the Plaintiffs. 
A. Standard of Review 
itA trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly 
erroneous.,,47 Factual findings are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence, which is evidence that a reasonable trier of fact could accept and rely upon 
in determining that such facts had been proved.48 An appellant must support assignments of error 
47 Argo.sy Trust ex reI. Its Trustee v. Winiger, 141 Idaho 570, 572, 114 P.3d 128, 130 
(2005). 
48 Elliott v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280,285,271 P.3d 678, 683 (2012). 
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with citations to the parts of the transcript or record relied upon.49 LA.R. 35(a)(6). However, the 
Supreme Court may exercise free review over a district judge's conclusions oflaw. 50 
B. Did the District Court err when it determined that Defendant April Fano breached 
the contract between the parties when all evidence of breach predated the contract? 
The District Comt's finding of breach of contract was clearly erroneous because the 
record did not contain any evidence of a breach. The section of the Release Agreement the 
District Court found April violated was the portion of the Contract stating that the Parties were 
not to make any disparaging, defaming or otherwise negative comments after July 30, 2010. 
However, the record is void of any such statement after July 30, 2010. 
A release is a type of contract wherein one patty makes a complete abandonment of a 
cause of action. 51 As a policy, such agreements are favored to foster settlement of litigation. 52 
Tn Lomas, a developer obtained a loan needed to finance another loan to continue a development 
project. 53 A lender provided such a 10an.54 The loan contained a release clause stating the 
borrower released the lender from "any and all claims of any nature whatsoever which you or 
any of you may have or claim to have on account of past dealings with the company.,,)5 
49 Echo Vanderwal v. Albar, Inc., 303 P.3d 175, (2013), citing LA.R. 35(a)(6). 
50 Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6, 56 P.3d 765, 768 (2002). 
51 Lomas & Nettleton Co., v. Tiger Entelprises, Inc., 99 Idaho 539 542, 585 P.2d 949, 
952 (1978). 
52 Lomas at 542. 
53 Lomas at 541. 
54 Lomas at 541. 
55 Lomas at 541. 
11 
Subsequently, the borrower required more money to finalize his development project. 56 When 
the lender refused to extend more money, the borrower sought to set aside the agreement and 
alleged breach of contract because the lender refused to give further financing after the loan. 57 
The Idaho Supreme Court ruled that it was proper for the District Court to refuse to set the 
agreement aside because the evidence was void of wrongful conduct by the lender. 58 The lender 
was not obligated to provide more loans pursuant to the terms of the release, and therefore, the 
lender's refusal to extend more loans was not actionable. 59 
In this case, the District Court's finding of a breach was clearly erroneous because no 
evidence of a breach was presented at trial. Pursuant to the terms of the Mutual Release 
Agreement, the parties agreed not to make any disparaging, defaming or otherwise negative 
comments about each other after July 30, 2010 (the date of the Release Agreement).6o The 
Parties specifically released each other from any statements made before July 30, 2010, or 
disclosures of infonnation regarding the Previous Lawsuit before July 30, 2010. 61 Thus, in order 
for the Plaintiffs to prove a prima facia case of breach of contract, they were required to prove 
that the negative statement occurred after July 30,2010. Plaintiffs never plead a cause of action 
to set aside or disregard the release agreement. 
56 Lomas at 541. 
57 Lomas at 541. 
58 Lomas at 543. 
59 Lomas at 543. 
60 Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Release Agreement dated July 30,2010, paragraph 9. 
61 Id. Paragraphs 11 and 12. 
12 
It is anticipated that the Respondents will argue that the few days of separation between 
the printing ofthe book Shady Healing and the entry of the Mutual Release Agreement gives rise 
to some wrongdoing. However, both April and Vianna testified at trial that they were planning 
on trial in August, 2010 and did not believe the case would settle at mediation.62 Neither party 
had any contractual restriction on their ability to make negative comments about each other until 
after the execution of the Release Agreement. April testified that she did not plan on settling at 
mediation because she believed she had a good case. April was surprised when the case did 
settle at mediation. Thus, the Plaintiffs' suggestion that April entered into the Release 
Agreement in bad faith because she had formed Right Way Publishing and picked up the printed 
copies of the book 'Shady Healing' just eight or nine days earlier is clearly erroneous. 
Until the Release Agreement was signed on July 30,2010, April was under no restraint 
by law or statute from forming Right Way Publishing or making statements about Vianna Stiba1. 
The book was published days before the Release Agreement because that is when Lindsey Stock 
finished the book. Lindsey testified that she spent about a year and a half writing the book, and 
finished in June, 201 0.G3 Regardless, the key evidence for the Court to examine is whether there 
is any evidence of statements April made about Vianna after July 30, 2010. April did not 
anticipate or contemplate the possibility of entering an agreement with Vianna at any time before 
July 30,2010. 
62 Tr., p. 273, II. 4 12. 
63 Tr., p. 214, 1. 2 - p. 241, 1. 12. 
13 
Although the District Court found April Fano liable for breach of contract, he failed to 
identify a breach in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court correctly identified 
the issue, "whether April's involvement in the publishing of Shady Healing combined with the 
fact that the book was sold to the public after the Release Agreement was entered violated 
paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Release Agreement.'·64 However, the uncontroverted evidence at trial 
was that April's sole role in Right Way Publishing, LLC after the Release Agreement, was 
receiving bank statements. Again, the Court recognized this, stating, "The Court notes that it 
recognizes the arguments made by April that her actions in forming Right Way Publishing, LLC 
and paying for the printing of Shady Healings were not improper because she did not anticipate 
settling her case on July 30, 2010. While that may be true, it is not an excuse for failing to 
disclose the existence of the book once it became clear that she would agree to the requirements 
contained in the Release Agreement.,,65 In making this finding, the Court ignored the terms of 
the Mutual Release Agreement which specificaUy excused, "statements, disclosures, or other 
communications to third pmiies made before the date of this Agreement, whether known or 
unknown.,,66 In fact, the Mutual Release Agreement only applied to, "statements, disclosures, or 
other communications to third parties made before the date of this Agreement, whether known or 
unknown.,,67 The only conduct of April Fano after July 30, 2010 raised at trial was April's 
receipt of bank statements for Right Way Publishing, LLC. This behavior can hardly be 
64 R., p. 46. 
65 R 47 ., p. . 
66 Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Release Agreement, paragraph II. 
67 Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Release Agreement, paragraph 12. 
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interpreted as a disparaging, defaming or an otherwise negative comment regarding Vianna 
Stibal. 
All of the negative comments raised by the Plaintiffs at trial are contained in the book 
Shady Healing, written by Lindsey Stock, and published by Right Way Publishing, LLC. 
Defendants agree that the book Shady Healing contains negative comments about Vianna Stibal. 
Plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract was based upon mere speculation that these comments 
were made after July 30,2010. However, the uncontested evidence at trial showed that the book 
was printed before the Mutual Release Agreement was signed. Regardless, April was not the 
books author. It could be argued that April would have made a negative statement about Vianna 
Stibal if she sold or promoted the book after entry of the Release Agreement, but no such 
evidence is in the record. April testified: 
Q. Now, you received the printed copies ofthe book on what date? 
A. .Tuly 21,2010. 
Q. And what did you do with the printed copies of the book after that? 
A. I sent them to Lindsey Stock. 
Q. Have you promoted the book since July 30th of2010? 
A. No, I have not. 
Q. Have you made any public statements about the book since July 30th of 
2010? 
A, No, I have not. 
Q. Have you done that in internet or in person or any other means of 
communications? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you sold the book to anyone else? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you processed orders for the book? 
A. No. 




Q. What is your role then with Right Way Publishing post July 30, 2010? 
A. I received a bank statement. 
Q. Do you do anything else? 
A. I do [sic] not.68 
Notwithstanding this uncontradicted evidence, the District Court found that April's 
actionable conduct included (l) giving Lindsey Stock emails and portions of deposition from her 
previous lawsuit with Vianna; (2) paying for ",'hady Healing to be printed; (3) forming Right 
Way Publishing, LLC together with Lindsey Stock to publish Shady Healing, and (4) receiving 
bank statements for Right Way Publishing, LLC. Each of these issues will be addressed. 
1. April gave Lindsey Stock cmails and portions of a deposition from the 
Previous Litigation before July 30, 2010. 
April testified at trial that she gave Lindsey Stock emails and portions of a deposition 
from the Previous Litigation. 6'! However, April was released from this conduct because it was 
done before July 30,2010.70 The Plaintiffs did not present any evidence at trial to suggest that 
April Fano gave Lindsey Stock portions of Vi anna Stibal's deposition after July 30,2010. April 
could 110t have done so because the book finished printing on July 21, 2010. 
Similarly, April testified that she provided Lindsey with copies of emails between her and 
Vi anna Stibal. Again, however, April's uncontroverted testimony was that these emails were 
provided to Lindsey Stock shortly after April received them, long before July 30, 2010. 71 
68 T1'., p. 199, 1. 4 p. 200,1.5. 
6'! T1'., p. 192,1. 24 - p. 194,1.5. 
70 Jd. 
71 T 19 1'., p. 
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The Plaintiffs alleged, without evidence, that April gave Lindsey Stock copies of medical 
records that were produced during the Previous Litigation. However, as stated in the book, 
Shady Healing, the author Lindsey Stock acquired the medical records she cited in the book iI-om 
the internet, "according [sic] to the medical documentation that Vianna mistakenly posted in an 
attempt to prove that she did have cancer."n Lindsey Stock similarly testified that April did not 
give her the entirety of the deposition, "Because she told me that parts of it was sealed and so I 
didn't have access to it.,,73 
The Defendants even presented evidence that Vianna Stibal had put the suspect medical 
records on a video posted to www.youtube.comandVianna·sFacebookaccount.This evidence 
was presented as Defendants' Exhibit I, which was a copy of that medical record on Facebook.74 
The District Court did not raise the medical records in his Findings and Conclusions, so it is 
assumed the District Court agreed that April did not provide any medical records to Lindsey 
Stock. 
2. Right Way Publishing paid for the printing of the book Shady Healing 
before July 30, 2010. 
At triaL April admitted that she gave the money to Right Way Publishing to pay for the 
printing of the book Shady Healing, as a capital contribution to the company. However, April 
did not pay for the publishing, Right Way Publishing, LLC paid for it.75 Regardless, April 
n Tr., p. 184,1. 12 - p. 185,1. 15. 
TJ T " )'"'7 1')1 )'"'811 1., p. ~-' , . £.. - p. _-' , . . 
74 Exhibit I, Tr., p. 188, 1. 18 p. 190, 1. 6. 
75 Exhibit F, Billing fI-om Sunrise, Tr., p. 182, I. 16 p. 184,1. 5. 
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testified that the printing was paid for, and the books were picked up from Sunrise Printing on 
July 21,2010, nine days before the parties entered into the Release Agreement. 76 
This testimony was not refuted by the Plaintiffs. Vianna Stibal did not have any personal 
knowledge about when the book was written, \vhen it was completed, or when it was printed. 
She only knew that it was sold after the Mutual Release Agreement was signed. 77 Specifically, 
Vianna Stibal answered questions on cross examination as follows: 
Q. But you testified earlier that you weren't involved in the printing of the 
book. 
A. You're right, sir, I'm not. 
Q. And so you don't know when it was printed, do you? 
A. You're right, I don't. 
Q. And so for all you know the book was printed before the Release 
Agreement was signed; correct? 
A. For all I know. 78 
All witnesses either stated that the book was published before July 30, 2010 or they did not know 
when it was published. Therefore, it was clearly erroneous for the Court to determine that the 
printing of the book was part of an alleged breach. 
3. April formed Right Way Publishing, LLC before .July 30, 2010. 
April admitted that she and Lindsey Stock formed Right Way Publishing, LLC. 
However, the company was formed sometime before July 22,2010, and was registered with the 
76 Tr., p. 184, 11. 3 11. 
n Tr., p. 96, 1. 17 - p. 97, 1. 24. 
78 Tr., p. 102, 1. 26 p. 103,1. 8. 
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State of Utah on July 22,2010. 79 The formation of Right Way Publishing, LLC was not a 
negative comment about Vianna Stibal. Regardless, at the time April and Lindsey Stock 
registered the business, April was not under any legal limitation regarding her ability to make 
statements about Vianna Stibal. The Plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence that April 
personally distributed or sold the book Shady Healing after July 30,2010. Again, the 
uncontroverted evidence was that April did not sell, promote, or distribute the book Shady 
Healing after the Release Agreement was executed. Without evidence of a breach, the District 
Court's finding of a breach was clearly erroneous. 
4. Receiving banli statements for Right Way Publishing, LLC is not a 
breach of the Release Agreement. 
April received bank statements for Right Way Publishing at her home. This action did 
not include any negative statements about Vianna Stibal. April was clearly within her rights 
after the entry of the Release Agreement to collect bank statements. Therefore, finding a breach 
based upon this behavior is clearly erroneous. 
Pursuant to the terms of the Release Agreement, April can only be held liable for any 
breach that occurred after July 30,2010. The Parties released each other from any claim or any 
cause of action, known or unknown, before the date ofthe Release Agreement. The Parties 
specifically agreed that they would not be liable for "any statements, disclosures, or other 
communications to third parties made before the date of this Agreement, whether known or 
unlrnown" (emphasis added). 
79 T1'., p. 276, 11. 12 21, see also, Defendant's Exhibit C, Articles of Organization of 
Right Way Publishing, LLC. 
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C. Did the District Court err in finding $6,250.00 in contract damages against 
Defendant April Fano'? 
Even if the Plaintiffs could prove a breach of the contract, they did not prove any 
damages. In addition, the damages the Court found were highly speculative. Only damages that 
are a direct consequence of a breach are recoverable.3o Thus, recoverable damages are those 
arising naturally from the breach.sl Damages must be direct and certain, and remote or 
speculative damages are not recoverable. 82 For example, in De Winer, the Defendants breached a 
contract stating they would pay the Plaintiffs for room and board for their construction crew until 
a certain time. X3 When the Defendants ended their arrangement early, the Plaintiffs sued for 
damages. The Court ruled that the damages were not speculative because the amount of 
damages could be ascertained with reasonable accuracy what profits the Plaintiffs would have 
made if the breach had not occurred. 84 
In this case, the damages awarded to the Plaintiffs did not arise from the breach, but was 
simply a portion of the consideration paid to enter into the Release Agreement. In the Previous 
Litigation, before trial, April had three counterclaims against the Respondents. She was allowed 
by Judge Anderson to amend her complaint to seek punitive damages. As April stated in her 
testimony, she felt that she had a very good case against the Plaintiffs in the Previous Litigation, 
80 J B. Traylor v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 99 Idaho 560, 561,585 P.2d 970,571 (1978). 
81 Traylor at 561 
82 Palmer v. Hwy. Dist. No.1, 49 Idaho 596,602,290 P. 393, 399 (1930), see also, 
DeWiner v. Nelson, 54 Idaho 560,564,33 P.2d 356,360 (1934). 
83 Palmer at 362. 
84 Palmer at 367. 
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and expected the case to go to trial. S) The $12,500.00 was paid by Vianna to settle all claims 
existing between the parties, including April's three counterclaims and punitive damages, in 
exchange for the mutual release. It was not specified in the Mutual Release what amount was 
paid in exchange for April's agreement not to make disparaging, defaming or negative comments 
about Vi anna. Plaintiffs paid that money to settle all matters before that court, including April's 
claims. 
Nevertheless, the District Court in this case awarded the Plaintiffs an arbitrary amount of 
one half of the money the Plaintiffs paid when they entered into the Release Agreement There 
is no logic to this amount, or an explanation as to how the District Court arrived at this number. 
The core problem with this decision is that the Court has no way of knowing what amount of the 
settlement, if any, was in exchange for the confidentiality promise, and promise regarding future 
negative statements. [t is more likely that the amount paid was compensation for April's breach 
of contract claim, fraud claim, and punitive damages claim. 
In their arguments, Plaintiffs requested damages included the entire $12,500.00 paid 
pursuant to the terms of the Release Agreement, and their attorney's fees in the Previous 
Litigation in the amount of$55,510.00. The District Court correctly ruled that the attorney's 
fees were not recoverable. The District Court also correctly found that $12,500.00 was not 
solely for the purpose of the agreement not to make negative comments about each other. 
However, the District Court was clearly erroneous when it found that half of the $12,500.00 was 
recoverable. Only damages that are a direct consequence of the breach are recoverable. 
85 'r )7'"' 11 4 20 r., p. __), . - . 
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The Plaintiffs were not damaged $12,500.00 as a result of the breach, but paid that 
amount to settle the claims in the Previous Litigation. [f the Plaintiffs had presented evidence of 
lost business, for example, as a result of the alleged breach, then the Court could determine if 
those damages would be recoverable. However, no such evidence was presented at trial. 
The District COUli seemed to be aware that apportioning the $12,500.00 settlement would 
be speculative, but did it anyway. According to De Winer, speculative damages are too remote to 
be awarded. Therefore, the damages should have heen denied, not arbitrarily apportioned. It 
was clearly erroneous for the District Court to award damages that were not the direct result of 
the breach. Because no evidence of directly resulting damages was offered at trial, the award of 
damages must be reversed. 
D. Did the District Court crr in its assessment of punitive damages against Defendant 
April Fano when all of April Fano's conduct predated the contract? 
Because April did exactly what the Release Agreement required her to do, punitive 
damages are not appropriate. As a prerequisite to obtaining punitive damages, the plaintiff must 
first be entitled to legal or equitable relief. 86 Thereafter, punitive damages must be proven by 
I d .. 'd 87 C ear an convmcmg eVl ence. 
"Punitive damages are not favored by the Courts, and should only be awarded in the most 
unusual and compelling circumstances.,,88 To justify a claim for punitive damages, the Plaintiff 
R6 Payne v. Wallace, 136 Idaho 303, 308,32 P.3d 695, 700 (Id. Ct. App., 2001), quoting 
BoL'I'e Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 906-07, 453 P.2d 551, 555-56 (1969), and Aztec Ltd., 
Inc. v. Creekside lnv. Co., 100 Idaho 566, 570, 602 P.2d 64, 68 (1979). 
87 Idaho Code §6-1604(l). 
88 Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., 122 Idaho 47,52,830 P.2d 1185, 1190 (1992). 
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must prove the actor's conduct was "an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, 
and that the act was performed by the defendant with an understanding of or disregard for its 
likely consequences.,,89 Further, the actions must have been made with an extremely harmful 
state of mind. 90 The defendant must have acted with an understanding of or disregard for likely 
f'h' . 91 consequences 0 IS actIOns. 
In short, the plaintiff must prove a bad act and a bad state of mind.lJ2 In Trees, the parties 
entered into a contract in which one construction company that was bonded agreed to bid on 
projects while another un-bonded construction company agreed do all the work.93 The District 
Court had awarded one party punitive damages claiming it fraudulently entered into the 
Contract.94 However, the Idaho Supreme Court found that this contract was illegal and both 
. I . 9" TI f' I C I dId" , d f .. d 96 parties mew It. - 1ere ore, t 1e ourt ovcrru e t 1C Istnct court s awar o' pumtlve amages. 
Punitive damages simply could not be assessed when both parties understood the bargain they 
'vvcre entering. 
This case is not like the limited number of cases that justify punitive damages. Trial 
revealed only one action by April Fano regarding the book Shady Healing after July 30, 2010; 
ge) Cheney v. Palos Verdes fnv. Corp .. 104 Idaho 897, 905, 665 P.2d 661,669 (1983). 
C)O Cheney at 905. 
91 Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale COf1)., 140 Idaho 416, 424, 95 P.3d 34, 42 (2004). 
92 Myers V Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495,503,95 P.3d 977,985 (2004). 
93 Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 5, 56 P.3d 765. 767 (2002). 
94 Trees at 5. 
95 Trees at 11. 
l)(i Tree.,' at 11. 
she received the bank statements for Right Way Publishing. This is not oppressive or fraudulent 
conduct. If April Fano sold and promoted the book Shady Healing after the entry of the Release 
Agreement, then the Court could consider punitive damages. However, without proving a legal 
or equitable remedy, punitive damages were clearly erroneous. 
The District Court reasoned that punitive damages were appropriate because April knew 
at mediation that she helped publish the book Shady Healing nine days earlier and did not 
disclose this fact at mediation.97 This standard places a burden on April Fano beyond what the 
Release Agreement required. The Release Agreement did not mandate the Pmiies disclose 
previous behavior. In fact, the Release Agreement anticipated that there would likely be conduct 
by each of the parties that was "lmown or unknown" and therefore not disclosed.98 Like the 
parties in Trees, the Plaintiffs knew the nature and terms of their agreement. Viam1a Stibal knew 
April had made negative and disparaging comments about her before July 30, 2010 because 
Vianna had sued April for defamation. The release was specifically intended to bar future 
litigation in the event previous statements were subsequently discovered. The Plaintiffs should 
be held to the consequence of their bargain. Punitive damages were inappropriate. 
Because the primary purpose of punitive damages is to deter wrongful conduct, the Court 
should have determined if April Fano was engaging in conduct that needed to be deterred. All of 
April's conduct since July 30, 2010 has been receiving bank statements for Right Way 
Publishing, LLC. Such behavior does not need to be deterred. 
97 R -" ., p. ::U. 
98 Release Agreement. 
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As set forth above, the conduct giving rise to punitive damages must be proven by clear 
and convincing evidence. In the Findings and Conclusions, the District Court never set forth the 
standard of "clear and convincing" or acknowledged that punitive damages must be proven by 
this high standard. 99 The District Court's failure to identify its burden amounts to an abuse of its 
discretion. 
In addition, the District Court abused its discretion when it allowed the Plaintiffs to 
amend their Complaint to seek punitive damages. The District COUli stated; 
Although the Defendants argue that the actions of April Fano upon which 
Plaintiffs base their motion occurred before July 30, 2010, the book at issue was 
set to be published after July 30, 2010. As such, this Court finds that Plaintiffs 
have met their burden to amend the Complaint to include punitive damages. 
Where this case is not being tried to ajury, the Court will determine the full 
1· . f' 1 d . I 100 app lcatlOn 0 t le amen ment at tna . 
Defendants assign two areas of error in this finding. First, there was no evidence 
presented at trial, much less in support of the motion for punitive damages, that the book Shady 
Healinf{ was set to be published after July 30, 2010. The uncontroverted evidence was that 
publication OCCUlTed on July 21, 2010, before the entry of the Release Agreement. In addition, 
there was never any evidence presented at trial, much less in suppOli of the motion for punitive 
damages, that April Fano was distributing the book after July 30, 2010. Without this evidence, 
allowing Plaintiffs to seek punitive damages was error. 
99 R., 53-54. 
100 R., p. 31, Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint to Include 
Punitive Damages. 
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E. Were the punitive damages assessed against Defendant April Fano unjust or 
excessive when they amounted to almost all her yearly income? 
Punitive damages are limited to be the greater of $250,000.00 or three times the 
d . 1 . d 101 compensatory amages 111 t le .IU gment. In addition, the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that the degree of reprehensibility of conduct be the chief consideration 
when assessing punitive damages. 102 While the state courts may impose punitive damages to 
further a state's legitimate interest in punishing unlawful conduct, "when an award is grossly 
excessive in relationship to those interests it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.,,103 fn Walston, the Court found the Defendants' deceptive business practice of 
representing its coverage as high when it was very low, representing itself as endorsed by a 
Masonic organization, and refusing to pay a claim that any reasonable person would find to be 
appropriate was highly reprehensible. Conversely, BMW's conduct of repainting a car prior to 
sale was not very reprehensible. 104 BMW's conduct did not include "deliberate false statements, 
acts of affirmative misconduct, or concealment of evidence of improper motive.,,105 Thus, 
BMW's less reprehensible conduct entitles the Plaintiff to lower punitive damages. 106 
101 Idaho Code §6-1604(3). 
102 B1VfW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1599, (1996). 
103 Walston v. ~Monumental Life Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 211, 222, 923 P.2d 456, 467 (1996), 
citing BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1595 (1996). 
104 Walston at 222. 
105 Walston at 222. 
106 Walston at 222. 
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In this case, April's conduct, \vhich did not violate the Release Agreement, was not 
adequatel y reprehensible to justify the award of punitive damages. Moreover, the District Court 
did not have any documentation to understand April's financial position to determine what 
amount of punitive damages was appropriate to deter wrongful conduct. At the beginning of 
triaL the District Court heard and granted Defendants' Motion to Quash a subpoena issued by the 
Plaintiffs to obtain April Fano's financial records. 107 No documents were provided evidencing 
April Fano's income or ability to pay a punitive damages award. Therefore, the Court did not 
have sufficient facts to determine what kind of an award of punitive damages would be 
appropriate for April Fano. April Fano is an individual, not a national corporation that could pay 
a large punitive damage award. Thus, the Court, as a result of its own order quashing April's 
financial documents, did not have the information that would be necessary to determine what 
size of an award would be appropriate. 
In addition, April Fano's conduct is not highly reprehensible like the conduct of the 
insurance company in Walston. April Fano' s conduct does not even rise to the level of BMW 
who repainted cars prior to sale without disclosing that fact. April Fano simply did not have any 
obligation to disclose prior actions before the Release Agreement because not only is the Release 
Agreement void of any such duty, but the Release Agreement specificallY anticipates the 
possibility of unknown conduct by each side. April did not make any deliberate false statements 
or wrongful acts like the insurance company in Walston. Rather, April abandoned all prospects 
to sell or promote the book Shady Healing in an attempt to follow the terms of the Release 
107 T '1 I '1 ~ I ] 8 1'., p. J, . .)- p.),. . 
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Agreement. As stated by April, she took the Release Agreement, "dead serious" because she did 
not want to be sued again. I08 Such minor conduct and genuine attempt to abide by the terms of 
the Release Agreement does not support any award of punitive damages, much less such a 
significant award. 
F. Did the District Court err in awarding attorney fees and costs to the 
Plaintiffs/Respondents when the Judgment a'warded Plaintiffs at trial was 
substantially less than the amount they sought? 
The Comi abused its discretion in granting Plaintiffs' their attorney's fees and costs 
because the Plaintiffs prevailed on only one of five issues raised in their complaint, and received 
a judgment significantly less than what they sought at trial. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d) 
provides for costs as a matter of right to the prevailing party. Similarly, Idaho Code §12-121 
allows the judge in any civil action to award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or 
parties. More specifically, Idaho Code §12-]20(3) allows the prevailing party to recover 
reasonable attorney's fees in any civil action relating to a contract for services and any 
commercial transaction. 
The determination of prevailing party status is in the sound discretion of the Court. 109 
The Court shall consider the result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective 
I08 Tr., p. 278, I. 14-p.278,1.18,seealso, Tr.,p. 181,1. 13 p.182,1.15. 
109 Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 538, 224 P.3d 1125, 1127 (2010). 
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parties. 110 Prevailing party status is awarded after an examination of the case as a whole, not a 
1 · b l' l' 111 C aIm- y-c aIm ana YSIS. 
In this case, the Plaintiffs are not the prevailing party because they only succeeded on one 
of five causes of action, breach of contract, and were mvarded only $6,250 in contract damages. 
Plaintiffs sought $68,010 against the Defendants as contract damages. 112 Plaintiffs cannot be 
considered prevailing parties when their award in contract damages was I ess than 10% of the 
damages sought at trial. Although Plaintiffs were awarded punitive damages against April, her 
exposure to punitive damages would have been greater if greater contract damages were 
awarded. 
G. Did the District Court err when it failed to award attorney's fees and costs to Right 
Way Publishing, LLC when it prevailed on all claims against it? 
Right Way Publishing should have been awarded its attorney's fees and costs because it 
was not found liable on any issue, and therefore proved a perfect defense at trial. Prevailing 
party status is awarded after an examination of the case as a whole, not a claim-by-claim 
analysis. I13 In Eighteen JUile, the Defendants to the lawsuit prevailed on all the Plaintiff's 
claims, but was awarded only $1,054.38 in the Defendants' counterclaim when it sought 
$12,000. The Idaho Supreme Court overturned the district comi's decision not to award 
110 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, 54( d)( 1). 
111 Eighteen JUile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 
117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005). 
112 R., p. 48. 
113 Eighteen lyfile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 
117 P.3d 130. 133 (2005). 
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attorneys' tees to the Defendants, saying, "the district court focused too much attention on the 
Company's less than tremendous success on its counterclaim and seemingly ignored the fact that 
the Company avoided all liability as a defendant. The district court improperly undervalued the 
Company's successful defense. Avoiding liability is a significant benefit to a defendant" I 14 
Justice Jones went on to give an analogy that, 
In baseball, it is said that a walk is as good as a hit. The latter, of course, 
is more exciting. In litigation, avoiding liability is as good for a defendant 
as winning a money judgment is for a plaintiff. The point is, while a 
plaintiff with a large money judgment may be more exalted than a defendant 
who simply walks out of court no worse for the wear, courts must not ignore 
the value of a successful defense. I 15 
'rhe Court also noted that some ofthe defendants, the individuals who owned Nord Excavating, 
and were included as defendants, were also prevailing parties because they incurred no liability 
l' . I d hI' 116 a ter tna an were not party to t e counterc aIm. 
In this Case, Right Way Publishing, LLC was not found liable on any count, and 
therefore provided a perfect defense. Because Right Way Publishing, LLC is "walking out of 
court no worse for the wear," the Court cannot ignore the value of their successful defense. As 
set forth in Defendants' Memorandum of Fees and Costs, Right Way Publishing is liable for half 
of the attorney's fees and costs for the Defendants. Defendants incurred $14,507.50 in attorney's 
114 Eighteen Mile Ranch, at 719. 
115 Eighteen Mile Ranch, at 719. 
116 Eighteen i\lfile Ranch, at 719. 
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fees and $1,264.25 in costs. Therefore, Defendant Right Way Publishing should have been 
awarded $7,132.12 in attorney's fees and $632.12 in costs. 117 
In its decision on attorney's fees, the District Court reasoned that because April was held 
liable for breach of contract and punitive damages, that Right Way Publishing, LLC should not 
be awarded its attorney's fees. 118 This finding ignores the prevailing law, and treats April and 
Right Way Publishing, LLC as if they were the same entity. The District Court did not find 
Right Way Publishing liable on any count. Whether or not April was found liable is 
inconsequential to Right Way Publishing, LLC's request for attorney's fees. The Court cannot 
ignore Right Way Publishing's perfect defense based upon a co-defendant's failure to obtain a 
perfect defense. Therefore, the Court abused its discretion on attorney's fees by failing to award 
Right Way Publishing, LLC its attorney's fees and costs. 
H. Should the Appellants be granted their reasonable attorney's fees and costs on 
appeal? 
Appellants anticipate by their arguments herein that they will be the prevailing party on 
this appeal, and therefore should be awarded their attorney's fees and costs. Attorney's fees and 
costs are specifically allowed by the terms ofthe Release Agreement between the parties. I 19 
[n the altemative, Appellants should be awarded their attorneys fees and costs pursuant to 
I.C. §§ 12-120 and I 121. It is well-established law before this Court "that I.C. §12-120 
117 R. Supp., P. 15. 
118 R., p. 64. 
119 Release Agreement, p. 6. 
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mandates an award of attomey fees to the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial." 120 In 
this case, the Respondents brought trial on breach of contract when they had no evidence of an 
actual breach. Appellants should be awarded their reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred 
in this appeal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The core problem with this case is that awarding the Plaintiffs damages for breach of 
contract requires the Court to ignore the terms of the contract which specifically excuse the 
conduct by April Fano that was raised at trial from liability. The District Court failed to hold the 
Plaintiffs to the terms of their contract, and failed to recognize that April Fano never made any 
disparaging, defaming, or negative comments about Vianna Stibal after the entry of the Release 
Agreement. 
April's conduct was appropriate, and after entering into the Release Agreement, she did 
not sell, promote, or distribute any copies of the book Shady Healing. It was error to impute the 
conduct of April's business partner, Lindsey Stock, to April. Regardless, the lack of damages, or 
reprehensible conduct by April makes an award of damages and punitive damages improper. 
Therefore, the finding of breach of contract and punitive damages, and the Judgment in favor of 
the Respondents should be reversed. The Appellants should be awarded their attomeys fees and 
costs on appeal. 
120 Chavez v. Barrus 146 Idaho 212, 225,192 P.3d 1036,1049 (2008)., citing Cox v. 
Mulligan, 142 Idaho 356,359, 128 P.3d 893,896 (2005). 
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Respectfully submitted this 13 th day of August, 2013. 
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Pike Herndon StosiCl & Johnston, P.A. 
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